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ABSTRACT 
Crowdsourcing Consciousness: 
You Think, Therefore I Am 
by 
Justin M. Campbell 
Utah State University, 2018 
Capstone Mentor: Dr. Charlie Huenemann 
Department: Philosophy , Psychology 
The challenge to understand consciousness is a centuries-old interdisciplinary research program . 
The search entails fundamental questions about our nature - the desire to understand who we 
are has been around for nearly as long as experience itself. It is also one of the most important 
questions we can ask; meaning itself is predicated on having some sort of conscious experiencer 
for whom something can matter. Given the magnitude and intractability of explaining the 
V 
paradox of how consciousness can be at once the most obvious thing in the universe, and also the 
most inaccessible, the endeavor is a tremendous undertaking . Until somewhat recently, there has 
been little cross-talk between these disciplines ; and in the absence of collaboration, a territorial 
dispute has emerged. The purpose of this thesis is two-fold: first, to trace a narrative thread 
across the history of thought by exploring philosophical theories dating back to ancient Greece, 
through the authoritatively scientific thought of the modem day. The second aim of this project is 
one of consilience, wherein by starting a dialogue between two approaches , that of science and 
philosophy , sincere progress can be made. In conclusion , the thesis ends with a provocation: 
much of our intimate experience is crowdsourced, and we are inescapably social. 
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"Human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery. A mystery is a 
phenomenon that people don't know how to think about - yet. There have been 
other great mysteries: the mystery of the origin of the universe, the mystery of life 
and reproduction, the mystery of the design to be found in nature, the mysteries of 
time, space, and gravity. These were not just areas of scientific ignorance, but of 
utter bajjlement and wonder. We do not yet have the final answers to any of the 
questions of cosmology and particle physics , molecular genetics and evolutionary 
theory, but we do know how to think about them. The mysteries haven't vanished, 
but they have been tamed. They no longer overwhelm our efforts to think about 
the phenomena, because now we know how to tell the misbegotten questions from 
the right questions, and even if we turn out to be dead wrong about some of the 
currently accepted answers, we know how to go about looking for better answers. 
With consciousness, however, we are still in a terrible muddle. Consciousness 
stands alone today as a topic that often leaves even the most sophisticated 
thinkers tongue-tied and confused. And, as with all the earlier mysteries, there are 
many who insist - and hope - that there will never be a demystification of 
consciousness . 
Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991) 
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Consciousness is an enigma. The deep-seated feeling of being a conscious agent engaging 
with the world is unshakably familiar - above all else, we carry around an intimate sense that 
there is something it is like to be us. We organically navigate a world of choices and sensations, 
and yet, despite being seemingly self-evident, these experiences are also the most inaccessible to 
the outside observer. The qualities of our direct experience escape any measurable description; 
consciousness is, at once, both lucid and obscure. Paradoxically, the first-person privilege that 
allows for an awareness of our own conscious experiences is the very same privilege that blocks 
our access to other's experiences. 
Wherein lies the disconnect? Given the ease with which we naturally engage with and 
experience the world, one might expect that the contents of that experience would be outright 
transparent. However, this is simply not the case. In this very moment, for example, I can smell 
the aroma of freshly-brewed coffee. The scent has filled the room with a toasty and inviting 
warmth. But this account pales in comparison to the richness of the actual experience. The 
description of warmth and the feeling of warmth are fundamentally disparate concepts. By the 
same token, it may prove impossible to describe color to those who have been blind since birth; 
if you try to do so, you will find that the perception has an ineffable quality that evades any sort 
of concrete explanation. The private nature of these experiential qualities, or qualia, are beyond 
our ability to clearly communicate. No additional information about objective properties seems 
capable of overcoming this divide. 
What is it about qualia that makes them so inaccessible? When mounting a search, it 
helps to know both what you are looking for and how best to go about locating that thing. After 
all, how else would you know when you had found it? For qualia, it appears we know neither. 
The most direct approach seems to be through the neurosciences, but this approach soon meets 
the obstacle that observing brain activity and experiencing brain activity are not wholly 
congruent. At a basic level, brain activity is largely observable - driven by detectable, physical 
changes in electrochemical potentials within neurons - much like the actions of any other 
mechanical system. But observing this does not equal the experience that lies "within" that 
machine . 
Imagine you were able to step into such a system and monitor its operation from within. 
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You may witness these functions arising from mechanical causes (i.e., the firing of electrical 
signals and shunting of blood flow), more deserving of attention are the functions you are unable 
to see. Our thoughts and emotions certainly have a neural signature - they arise from some sort 
of brain activity- although the simple act of observing this activity seems to bring us no closer 
to the actual experience. All we ever see are the mechanical causes; the quality of the emotion , 
content of the thought, or richness of the percept are out of reach. This explanatory gap was first 
highlighted by Gottfried Leibniz, the German mathematician, and philosopher; bridging this gap 
has been a major obstacle to the scientific study of consciousness ever since. 
Many other philosophers have called attention to this epistemic rift. One notably 
persuasive application was articulated by the philosopher Frank Jackson's thought experiment: 
"Mary the Color Scientist". Suppose, he argues, there lives a woman named Mary, who has spent 
her entire life studying the mechanisms of color perception. She has been incredibly successful, 
and knows all that can be known about the physical properties within the wide spectrum of 
colors; in detail, she can describe the interaction between different wavelengths of light and the 
optics of the eye, the neurophysiology underlying each percept, and even how the brain 
processes that information . There is, however, one important caveat: she has never actually seen 
any colors at all. Mary, for her entire life, was raised in an isolated room completely devoid of 
color . If she were later able to escape that environment and step outside, what would her 
experience be? Would you expect her to gaze at the blue sky and unremarkably claim "of course 
that is blue", or rather, exclaim, "Wow! I never imagined blue would look like that"? 
Viscerally, some are drawn to the idea that this is in fact new information, a raw 
experience, that no amount of reading textbooks could have prepared her for. Notice however, 
that if her knowledge of color's physical properties were truly complete , her conceptual 
understanding would be absolute . Even still, it seems she is able to gain the previously unknown 
infonnation about the subjective experience of what color is like. 
The merits of this common belief have since been challenged, though , despite the 
absence of any present consensus among philosophers, the thought experiment is powerful in its 
ability to cast light on the intuition that objective information alone paints an incomplete picture 
of the world. We must leave room for conscious experience. 
A Hard Problem Indeed 
"It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience ... It is widely 
agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good 
explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise 
to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet 
it does . " 
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996) 
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If the qualities of our experience exist in some fashion outside of the physical acts we 
directly observe, are they always necessary? In asserting that they are distinct and supplemental, 
one might reasonably ask whether they may be left out entirely . In other words, is it possible to 
conceive of a being in which their mental function remains intact, but thoroughly lacks any sort 
of subjective experience? 
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An early proponent of this line of inquiry was David Chalmers, who likewise wondered if 
what he termed a "Philosophical Zombie" was conceivable . These zombies supposedly bore an 
outward expression that was indistinguishable from their normal human counterparts; they could 
report on the experiences they were "having", their preferences, and desires. Beyond the surface, 
however, it was all a facade; there was no true consciousness, rather, just the product of cleverly 
programmed responses. 
Chalmers concedes that this thought experiment may be implausible - we have no 
reason to believe that these zombies are among us - yet the very notion that this scenario 
appears conceivable suggests that subjective phenomenal properties may be separated from the 
outwardly visible psychological properties (e.g., expressions of thoughts and desires). Science as 
a whole has made significant strides towards understanding these psychological properties; our 
understanding of the biological and chemical processes which allow the brain to function has 
grown tremendously. There are certainly many questions left to answer, but these are "easy" 
relative to the challenge presented by the other aspect of our experience: the phenomenal 
properties . Providing a scientific account of the mind's subjective contents are the real task worth 
pursuing, the Hard Problem of our time as Chalmers describes it. 
The Roots of Consciousness 
"Dualism makes the problem insoluble; materialism denies the existence of any 
phenomenon to study, and hence of any problem" 
John R. Searle (2002) 
Matter and Soul 
For centuries, philosophers and theologians alike have echoed the sentiment that mind 
and body are distinct; the suggestion of an afterlife implies that there is some part of you that 
transcends bodily death (i.e., an immortal soul). The roots of this idea can be traced to the works 
of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, who in his Phaedo, posited the existence of the Forms 
- a sort of eternal substance which exists in some realm beyond the material world. Whereas 
physical objects may have imperfections, the Forms were perfect and absolute. The Forms were 
thought to be of a different substance, one in which concepts of shape, size, and quantity do not 
apply. Since the Forms were supposedly immaterial, and the intellect was thought to gain 
knowledge through comprehension of these forms, Plato argued that the two may have an 
intimate connection which unites them after death. 1 
Plato's account is the first to delineate the world into two distinct types of things: 
physical substances (e.g., material objects) and mental substances (e .g., Forms) . This theory, 
which developed into what is known as substance dualism, was widely influential. Of the later 
contemporaries who would come to be associated with this view, few were as prominent as the 
French mathematician and philosopher, Rene Descartes. 
1 This assertion of the relationship between intellect and soul originated from a three-part series 
of arguments designed to prove the soul's immortality written in the Phaedo (Lorenz, 2009). 
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Like Plato, Descartes thought the world was composed of two substances: matter and 
mind (Hatfield, 2016). The familiar objects of our experience (e.g., trees, books, animals) are 
composed of matter, or res extensa. In contrast, mind, res cogitans, is the essential property 
which thinks and unites our experience; the part responsible for the feeling that there is a "you" 
somewhere in the body - allegedly located within pineal gland. It is this latter substance which 
makes humans unique. 
The Mind is Matter 
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The central issue at the heart of substance dualism is explaining how these two 
incompatible substances interact. As conscious beings we feel agency over our choices; the 
explanation offered by Descartes is that somehow the mind has the power and authority to cause 
changes in matter. When pressed for the details of how this interaction takes place, he offers little 
more than obscurities. The intricacies of this question are deeply problematic for the dualist. 
Take, for example, a game of billiards. Obviously, two material objects can interact -
the cue striking a ball, or balls impacting each other - but how could this movement, the 
outcome of a physical collision, be caused in the absence of a material force? Even the less 
visible forces, like gravity, amount to the attraction and repulsion of matter at the atomic scale. 
Descartes and other substance dualists, are faced with the challenge of explaining how it is that 
matter and mind, two irreconcilable substances, can somehow influence each other. This well 
known objection has been called the Mind-Body Problem. 
Absent any spooky, supernatural phenomenon, the Mind-Body Problem appears 
impossible to circumvent, and may perhaps be fatal to the theory of substance dualism. This 
criticism isn't limited to substance dualists alone, however; any theory which posits some 
immaterial substance or force alongside the material must explain how it is the two interface. 
Some contemporary theorists seem to have found a solution to the Mind-Body Problem: deny 
there is a problem altogether. 
The materialist camp challenges the fundamental dualist notion that there exists more 
than matter in the world. Instead, they propose something akin to: "what you see is all there is". 
After all, if you can explain the interaction without appealing to otherworldly mystical forces, 
why leave room for them? The feeling that there really is something more, an immaterial self 
apart from the body, amounts to little more than a trick, an illusion the brain plays on itself 
(Baggini, 2011). This mental trick certainly is a persuasive one, but you need not abandon 
conscious experience when you side with the materialists . 
Matter may be all that exists, though its presence alone does not generate consciousness; 
a heap of cells and tissues don't make a person for the same reason that you cannot drive to 
Tucson with only the parts of a car engine. What really matters is how the parts are arranged, 
what/unction they are able to perform together . Most modern materialists are in fact 
functionalists - asserting that once you have explained the various functions the mind is able to 
perform, you will have also explained consciousness itself. 
8 
By this account, our conscious experience is entirely the result of the complex interaction 
taking place between the nearly 100 billion neurons within the brain. This view doesn't deny 
there remains a great deal of mystery about the mind, though it asserts that these questions are, in 
principle, knowable; the mystery is not a supernatural one, but rather one that asks us to marvel 
at the remarkable intricacy of the system. 
An exemplary functionalist, Daniel Dennett, garnered his fame by laying a foundation 
through which we may begin to scientifically think about consciousness in this fashion. In his 
seminal book "Consciousness Explained'' he proposed the Multiple Drafts Model (2001). This 
novel framework challenged the notion of a singular location where consciousness "comes 
together", often denounced as the Cartesian Theater, and instead suggested that there are many 
possible experiences being assembled in parallel. The ongoing processing of inputs and outputs 
is analogous to constructing many possible drafts to a story. When one of the drafts is 
"published", or allowed to generate an action, then the story, the experience, is made concrete . 
Functionalist theories may do a better job of ushering the pseudoscience out of the 
picture, but at what cost? This lens, while successful in filtering out superstitious ideas, also 
reduced consciousness to something far more lackluster; by Dennett's account, qualia did not 
pose much of an interesting challenge at all - since qualia, as described by his critics, does not 
actually exist. (Dennett, 2002). Dennett's view is essential this: the grandiose, unsupportable 
claims about the contents of our experience should be treated as such, only after abandoning our 
misguided intuitions about consciousness can our understanding really gain traction . 
9 
Many of Dennett's critics felt that rather than explaining the tough questions at the heart 
of the debate around consciousness, he instead explained them away. Nonetheless , our 
experience feels like an authentic one - the things we see, touch, and hear, all seem to report to 
some single entity, a mind, trapped within the confines of the skull. What if, however, that "trap" 
was not much of a trap at all? 
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Boundaries of the Mind 
Our sense of self appears to extend throughout our body - we recognize the legs which 
help us to navigate as our own, not some independent entity that could "run off' in disagreement. 
Why then, do our intuitions lead us to view the brain as uniquely the source of our identity? Are 
we wholly misguided to think that the mind could be found in a single, discrete location? Could 
this artificial boundary drawn around consciousness, the bone envelope, be an arbitrary one? 
Here, the most basic of questions also proves to be one of the most challenging; where 
exactly is the mind? The possible responses to this issue markedly delineate the two distinct 
ways of conceptualizing the mind: should we think of our consciousness as being situated (i.e., 
located in a particular space) or distributed (i.e., delocalized in some sense). For those arguing 
the latter, tµe separation between mind, body, and environment is an unprincipled distinction 
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998). 
At first pass erasing these divisions may appear unintuitive. One notable proponent of 
this view, Andy Clark, has proposed the following thought experiment to bring our natural 
inclinations to light. Suppose that two people, Otto and Inga, are traveling to a museum at the 
same time. Unlike Inga, Otto has Alzheimer's disease, and must therefore record the directions in 
a notebook. Whereas Inga "reaches into" the contents of her brain for the directions, Otto reaches 
into his notebook; the only meaningful difference being that Inga's memory is processed 
internally, whereas Otto's is externalized. 
Should Otto's notebook be constantly and immediately accessible to him, it would appear 
to be functioning in an equivalent way to Inga's memory. Consequently, in treating Otto and 
Inga's employment of memory as truly analogous, it follows that the boundaries of mind may 
reasonable extend outward into the environment. 
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Other philosophers have gone even further with this line of reasoning. In the book "Out 
of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of 
Consciousness" , Alva Noe contends that the mind may not have any spatial location at all 
(2010). Historically, the problem has been the assumption that consciousness is some sort of 
process - like digestion. Instead, he suggests that we conceive of consciousness as an activity -
like dancing. 
In order to dance you need to be capable of some sort of motion. As humans, we have an 
intricate musculature capable of all sorts of complex movement. Muscles in isolation, however, 
don't dance ; dance is an activity, an engagement with the surrounding space. For this reason, it 
wouldn't be right to say that a dance is to be found within the body. In similar fashion, the brain 
may have an indispensable role in producing conscious experience, but that does not necessitate 
it as the location of that experience. Rather than search within the brain for experience, we 
should tum our attention outward, focusing instead on the ways in which we dynamically 
engage with the environment around us. 
The Neurobiological Study of Consciousness 
"The Astonishing Hypothesis is that 'You', your joys and your sorrows, your 
memories and your ambitions, your sense of identity and free will, are in fact no 
more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated 
molecules ... " 
Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis (1994) 
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Providing an empirical account of consciousness remains one of the great challenges of 
our time - the qualities of our experience seem inextricably outside the grasp of objective 
inquiry. For this reason, much of the contemporary research on consciousness addresses the 
Hard Problem only tangentially. Even still, the study of the mind has been far from a fruitless 
endeavor; cognitive scientists, neuropsychologists, and the like, have made tremendous headway 
in investigating a constellation ofrelated concepts ( e.g., free will, artificial intelligence). 
The more we are able to understand how these individual functions operate at the most 
basic level, the better the whole comes into focus. In this way, the mind is like a photomosaic -
though it is composed of hundreds, or thousands, of discrete parts, sometimes you can only make 
sense of the big picture by see_ing the relation between the parts. In many cases, these 
relationships are best illustrated by examining individuals whose experience is atypical. 
Damage, Disorders, and Deficits 
At the onset, studying subjective experience proves problematic because it is not clear in 
what method it should actually be undertaken. Self-reporting appears most direct, though in 
many interesting cases, one's perceptions and experiences can be radically misaligned. Take, for 
example, the fascinating condition of blindsight. 
Sometimes manifesting following a localized lesion or stroke within the primary visual 
cortex (VI), an individual with blindsight has seemingly disconnected visual awareness from 
visual attention . Patients may self-report having either partial or total blindness, while 
simultaneously responding to visual stimuli; in one case study, a man with blindsight was able to 
easily navigate a hallway, which unbeknownst to him, was staged with obstacles - even 
pressing up against a wall to squeeze by a trash can - while maintaining no conscious 
awareness of an ability to see his environment ( de Gelder, 2008). 
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Blindsight illustrates how attending to a stimulus, and being conscious of that stimulus, 
are not entirely synonymous . For any fan of magic this notion is far from controversial-we are 
often the subject of optical illusions, mental shortcuts, or subconscious priming, all of which take 
advantage of this discrepancy. 
In other cases, the problem is not a false-report, but rather, the inability to report entirely. 
Conscious experience exists on a gradient: ranging from those able to meaningfully engage with 
their environment, to others left in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) who exhibit no external 
signs of mental life. Among the most troubling are the minds trapped in a nightmarish limbo 
between life and death - those with locked-in syndrome. Patients who have locked-in syndrome 
typically have no loss of cognitive function, remaining fully conscious and aware, however they 
cannot express their thoughts due to a complete paralysis of nearly all muscles of their body. For 
many, the intactness of mind is an insufferable sort of torture, though a few patients have been 
able to find a surprising degree of purpose; in one remarkable instance, Jean-Dominique Bauby, 
who suffered from locked-in syndrome following a massive stroke, authored a memoir 
chronicling his experience solely by blinking. 
For those unable to report on the contents of their experience, functional brain scanning 
(e.g., fMRI, EEG, PET) provides a glimpse into the mind's activities. With methodological 
advances over the last decade, a prospective line of communication appears to have been opened. 
Previously, if patents bore no outward indication of awareness, they were naturally thought to 
lack any semblance of consciousness. Recent research from the lab of Adrian Owen, author of 
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"Into the Gray Zone: A Neuroscientist Explores the Border Between Life and Death", gained 
tremendous attention when this presumption was demonstrably shown to be false. In a now 
famous study published in Science, Owen took fMRI scans of a vegetative patient who was 
instructed to "imagine playing tennis" and the result was astonishing: the patient consistently 
showed activation in areas of the motor cortex that was homologous to the sort of activation seen 
in healthy volunteers (Owen et al., 2007). Using this method, other researchers have been able to 
replicate the findings with other comatose patients (Monti et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, observing activity is a far cry from observing experience. The degree of 
consciousness among patients in coma, PVS, or while under anesthesia, is a very lively, ongoing 
debate within medical ethics . 
It is worth noting that these disturbances do not necessarily imply a deficit of some sort. 
In many cases, these changes may instead be the consequence of something gained, rather than 
lost. Exogenous psychotropic drugs ( e.g ., mescaline, psilocybin) have been used throughout 
history in medicinal and spiritual purposes because of the profound alterations in consciousness 
that they produce; effects range from euphoria and relaxation to intense visual hallucinations and 
feelings of dissociation. 
For others, no psychoactive drugs are needed- the same sort of mysterious disturbances 
may arise organically within the brain. There is perhaps no better illustration of this phenomenon 
than synesthesia. Individuals with synesthesia, known as synesthetes, have a radically different 
sensory experience than others. In normal individuals, activation of the auditory pathway would 
produce sound. In a synesthete, however, perceptions are often multimodal: the sound of C-sharp 
may accompany the sight of a blue streak, a feeling of elation, or even the taste of strawberries. 
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Little is actually known about the etiology of synesthesia, but it is thought to be the result of an 
interplay between sensory pathways that are typically discrete . This sensory mixing happens in a 
manner unique to each synesthete; many enchanting examples are detailed in the iconic book 
" Wednesday is Indigo Blue" written by Richard Cytowic and David Eagleman, both of which are 
neuroscientists who have done pioneering research in the area (2009) . 
When the normal biological operations of the mind are disrupted, whether by something 
lost or something gained, so too are the contents and quality of one's experience. The interface 
between brain, mind, and self is an intimate one - by affecting the brain , the substrate upon 
which the mind so deeply depends, changes emerge throughout the system. Once the structure of 
thought and experience has been altered, dramatic modification to identity follow. 
One of the most well-known illustrations of this phenomenon comes from records dating 
back into the 1800's, concerning the infamous story of Phineas Gage. Having worked many 
years as a foreman helping to blast rock in preparation for laying new railroads , his job was to 
use a large iron rod to tamp down inert sand into holes filled with blasting powder. While his 
attention was directed elsewhere, he struck a blast hole filled solely with explosives, launching 
the iron rod up through his left cheekbone and out through the crown of his skull. To everyone's 
surprise, he not only survived the traumatic incident, but was also able to walk with little 
assistance to a nearby physician. 
Gage's survival after such significant damage to the brain is remarkable by itself. 
Miraculously, his mental function remained intact following the damage to his brain. The story 
was made famous, however, by the changes to his temperament which followed soon thereafter. 
Prior to the injury, he was well-regarded as a responsible, hard-working man . What remained 
was someone entirely different, a vulgar and profane man, recognizable only by appearance -
so changed was he, that his friends said he was no longer Gage. 
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The extent to which Gage's personality changed is hard to quantify given that the 
observations were taken so long ago. Research into the connection between mind and self has 
only deepened in the many decades which have followed, and some contemporary investigators 
have brought even more profound mysteries to light. One such investigator is Michael 
Gazzaniga, perhaps most well-known for his pioneering work with split-brain patients. 
In a typical individual, the brain has two distinct halves, the cerebral hemispheres, 
divided at the midline. Though mental functions frequently require a network of activation across 
the brain, in some cases, particular operations are lateralized - designated exclusively to one of 
thehemispheres; the capacity to produce speech and understand language, for example, are 
functions processed within regions only found in the left-hemisphere of most individuals. The 
interface between the hemispheres is a bundle of commissural fibers, a neural-bridge, known as 
the corpus collosum. Most often, the two hemispheres work in synchrony. However, should this 
relationship become a toxic one, the lines of communication are broken off. 
Severing the corpus collosum may serve as the last-resort intervention for those with 
intractable epilepsy - a malignant pattern of abnormal brain activity that is unresponsive to 
other forms of treatment. Through a surgical procedure the aberrant hemisphere is isolated, 
preventing the transmission of signals that would otherwise run rampant and wreak havoc 
throughout the brain . 
Though plastic and able to adapt to damage, the brain cannot fully recover from such a 
surgery. Once severed, the two hemispheres will have forever closed-off any direct means of 
communication, each continuing to operate independently of the other. The outcome is an 
interesting one: leaving not one, but two minds, each with their own unique thoughts, interests, 
and preferences. 
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Two minds housed within one body? The notion is so strikingly foreign that reconciling 
the idea with our own experience is exceptionally challenging. The discovery of this 
phenomenon was the product of ingenuity at the hand of researchers, like Gazzaniga , who found 
a means of exploiting the unique manner in which the brain is wired. 
Absent any damage, the eyes acquire information from both the left and right visual 
fields. They then transmit those signals to the brain where a single, synthesized image is 
resolved. But due to a "crossing-over" of nerves at the optic chiasm, the left hemisphere receives 
information from the right visual field, while the right hemisphere processes information from 
the left visual field. Much of the brain operates in this contralateral fashion - the left brain 
controls the right side, and the right brain has dominion over the left. For most individuals, this 
presents no issue; if one hemisphere "sees" something the other does not, it communicates that 
infonnation across the corpus collosum. For split-brain patients however, it is not so 
straightforward. 
Only the left hemisphere is verbal (i.e., able to articulate speech and understand 
language) . When interacting with a split-brain patient, the dialogue is with their left brain; the 
right brain resides as a mute observer . Experimentally, researchers discovered that if you quickly 
present a stimulus to the left visual field - processed by the right brain alone - then the left 
brain will report not having seen anything (Gazzaniga, 2011). Though the right brain is unable to 
speak , if you give it the opportunity to act, for example by pointing with the left hand , which it 
controls, then the object can still be identified. 
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This presents an interesting dilemma : on one hand , patients are able to physically identify 
whatever object was presented, yet they verbally report not having seen anything at all. How are 
these two incongruous behaviors resolved? When faced with a discrepancy of this sort, the left 
brain, spares itself from any discomfort with a creative solution: tell a lie. What is most 
fascinating is that it does not even realize it is lying - instead , while desperately trying to make 
sense of the experience, the brain confabulates a fictional story to account for the action. 
Since only the left hemisphere is able to tell these stories, to construct the narrative, it 
was coined "the interpreter" by Gazzaniga. The result is an asymmetrical relationship with its 
silent partner, the right hemisphere, who learns only of the story once it has been articulated by 
its overseer . 
Though disturbances of consciousness offer a fascinating way to study the ways which 
the mind can be altered and influenced, they stop short of yielding a holistic understanding; after 
all, these sorts of conditions are rare medical oddities, a notable departure from most everyone 
else's typical experience. Other lines of research have chosen to focus less on the anomalies and 
more on the norm - seeking to provide an answer for why conscious experience exists in the 
first place . 
Contemporary Theories of Consciousness 
"Within psychology and neuroscience, some new and rigorous experimental 
paradigms for studying consciousness have helped it begin to overcome the 
stigma that has been attached to the topic for most of this century. " 
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David Chalmers (I 99 7) 
Consciousness is a Social Narrative 
Though many functions are shared with other mammals, humans have a uniquely well-
developed ability to communicate. The capacity for language and communication certainly is not 
exclusive to homo sapiens, these abilities developed far earlier in our shared evolutionary 
history, though our faculties far exceed what other organisms appear capable of. 
Not all communication is verbal; in fact, the actual words spoken compose only a minor 
fraction of what is conveyed . Subtle differences in tone, direction of eye gaze, gestures, and 
body-language all influence how a message is perceived. Our innate knack for understanding 
these various components has proven extremely advantageous - being able to quickly, and 
accurately, distinguish a friend offering aid from an enemy threatening survival may mean the 
difference between life and death. 
Communication is often nuanced . Consequently, large swaths of our brain are dedicated 
exclusively to this sort of social-cognitive perception, giving rise to specialized areas which help 
to make sense of the complex, multimodal information . One such region is the tem_poro-parietal 
junction (TPJ) - an area of the brain located near the uppermost portion of the ear. The TPJ 
tends to light up during all sorts of social perception, though is most associated with processing 
that involves Theory of Mind (ToM). 
Few aspects of social interaction are as essential as the ability to understand the desires 
and intentions of others. Given our biological constraints, we cannot simply step-into another's 
mind - though, we can run simulations of it. Each time we try to assume a different person's 
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viewpoint, we are making informed guesses about the contents of their experience, constructing 
a theory of their mind. 
Some theorists have suggested that this ability to understand the minds of others 
eventually turned inwards. In other words, humans developed consciousness, a sort of self-
awareness, once able to ascribe that same awareness to others. Research in social-cognitive 
neuroscience appears to support this developmental handover; studies consistently indicate that 
the TP J is activated both when attributing mental states to others and when attributing mental 
states to oneself (Carrington & Bailey, 2009). 
While the exact mechanistic explanation may differ between social theories, most view 
consciousness as an effect of being able to interpret our own behavior. Absent this ability to 
provide an explanation, our actions would become confused and random, seemingly without 
purpose. It is through consciousness that a coherent narrative throughout life is forged, one that 
unites separate events into a single continuous experience. 
As a whole, social theories provide a good account for the presence of self-knowledge. 
Critics, however, are quick to point out that self-awareness is not identical to awareness of 
external events. For example, the brain may construct a narrative to explain why it avoids foul 
smells ( e.g., rotten things are bad), which demonstrates a certain degree of self-awareness , while 
at the same time offering no account for the actual phenomenal experience; in other words, social 
theories provide an explanation for the effects of consciousness, but not the experience itself. 
Consciousness is Integrated Information 
The brain may be the most elaborate system in the known universe; with an estimated 86 
billion neurons, each synapsing with potentially up to 10,000 other neurons, the network is 
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remarkably intricate (Azevedo et al., 2009). This complex biological assembly may have 
developed to meet the needs of the equally massive degree of information that it processes . In the 
same way that sounds from different instruments fuse together in an orchestral arrangement, the 
brain unites entirely distinct sources of stimuli ( e.g., electrochemical signals , photons of light, 
mechanical pressure from sound waves) into a synthesized product. Underlying every action , 
each thought or feeling, lies an around-the-clock computer which gives rise to a marvelous 
biological symphony: our experience . 
Brains function, at least in some respects, analogously to how a computer operates: 
information is received from some source, it is broken down into the simplest form for 
processing, and the product is broadcast in some fashion. All our mental functions appear to 
follow this template, though we often pay the actual computations little attention - usually 
taking place "under the hood", outside of our conscious awareness. 
As the computations performed take on additional layers of complexity, so too may the 
results . Take for example , how an image is constructed . At the most rudimentary level, details 
about the orientation of lines are encoded corresponding to the presence of edges and outlines. 
Changes in the line 's position within the visual field indicate some degree of movement. Familiar 
shapes and objects are recognized , and the constellation of related constructs within memory 
guide the perception of other forms. Contrast between textures is quantified, and the qualities of 
color are layered onto the image proportional to combinations of particular wavelengths of light. 
All these steps are processed in parallel and without expending any degree of conscious effort. 
The field of neuroscience has laid the framework by which we may come to understand 
exactly how our brains accomplish feats of this sort. Tremendous progress has been made on this 
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front; there exists now at least a basic mechanical understanding of many of the functions we are 
able to perform. Given that this computational perspective has been so instructive, some have 
proposed that it may similarly provide an account of the mind's most enigmatic function : 
consciousness. 
In 2004, Giulio Tononi proposed his Integrated Information Theory (!IT), and it has since 
been recognized by notable researcher Christo[ Koch as "the only really promising fundamental 
theory of consciousness". Tononi's account treats consciousness like any other mental function, 
albeit an incredibly complex one, positing that it manifests from the complex integration of 
information in the brain . To supplement his theory, he formalized a means of mathematically 
quantifying the degree of informational integration using a value denoted as phi . 
Functional brain scanning while under anesthesia seems to lend some some independent 
support for IIT; the loss of conscious awareness correlates with a corresponding decrease in 
global activation of neural networks within the brain . While IIT appears to present a simple, 
straight-forward way of thinking about consciousness , the underlying math which substantiates 
the theory is far less clear. Part of the challenge for the theory has been finding an objective way 
to measure phi ; as it stands , phi appears more like a theoretical construct than a tool for actual 
applied analysis. 
Further , not all information is equally valuable. Through the senses, the brain collects a 
astronomical amount of data and must filter through it to find what is meaningful - only a small 
fraction of what is kept even makes it into conscious awareness , the rest is delegated to the 
subconscious . Despite being inaccessible directly, the contents of our subconscious also undergo 
a great deal of processing and inform the conscious decisions we make . 
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If complex bits of information are processed and integrated at the unconscious level, why 
does consciousness not result? Computers of all sorts integrate information, some at a scale far 
greater than what is possible for humans - even the internet, perhaps the most massive source 
of integrated information, fails to show even the slightest sign of being endowed with a 
conscious experience . Proponents of IIT would likely respond that global integration of 
information is necessary for consciousness, though not sufficient since the type of information 
also matters deeply. From here, the challenge only deepens: explaining exactly what special 
qualities the information must have demands some understanding of the physical correlates of 
consciousness, which thus far have not been discovered. 
Consciousness is the Attention Schema 
Novel work by the neuroscientist and philosopher Michael S. A. Graziano has given rise 
to a new hypothesis, The Attention Schema Theory (AST) which appears to unite the positive 
elements from other contemporary theories while also avoiding their respective weaknesses. 
Graziano's new book, "Consciousness and the Social Brain" details the nuances of the theory at 
length. 
At the heart of AST is the idea that the brain constructs constructs schemas, an 
informational model, to organize this data. Schemas of all sorts may be used to integrate 
information; one of the familiar illustration of this modeling is the concept of body schema. In 
each moment, the brain maintains · an internal model of the body's position in space - arising 
from the integration of proprioceptive information from the limbs. Accessing this schema helps 
to coordinate and plan motion. When focus is directed outward toward an object, an apple for 
example, an informational representation of that apple is constructed (e.g., shape, location, 
color). 
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Within other theories, the term consciousness is often used interchangeably with 
attention, awareness, and experience . For AST, however, these semantic differences matter a 
great deal because they concern discrete phenomena. Graziano prefers a neuroscientist's 
interpretation of the term attention (i.e., a method of managing data). The brain has the ability to 
exercise some control over how it allocates its resources; choosing to attend to the violinists 
within a symphony orchestra entails the boosting of particular signals and the dampening of 
others. 
Graziano 's novel contribution is the idea that attention itself is similarly modeled in this 
way. The attention schema is thus an information model of the act of attending to something. In 
the same way that attention is constantly changing, so too is schema responsible for monitoring 
these changes. within the attentional schema, and reporting on the current state of its focus. 
This cognitive framework stems largely from the manner in which the brain manages the 
"problem of other minds" - the notion that we are immersed in a social context where we 
engage with other minds, and yet have no clear way to "step-into" their experience and really 
understand their inner mental life. Though we do not have direct access, knowing what others 
around you are thinking poses a strong evolutionary benefit; the ability to predict another's 
intentions and desires can make the difference between life and death. Humans seem to navigate 
this problem intuitively by using theory of mind, which allows us to make informed guesses 
based on what information is available (e.g., body language, context). In this way, the "black 
box" becomes accessible by constructing a schema of their mind. 
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The most controversial claim that Graziano makes is that this awareness, the model of 
attention, is synonymous with consciousness. Whereas others point to the ineffable qualia which 
seem to underlie subjectivity, Graziano, in line with Dennett (2017), argues that we don't 
experience qualia in the way that we believe we do. In fact, the idea of experience itself is rather 
a sort of "user-illusion" wherein there really is no true subjective perspective. In other words, we 
have the same access problem with our own minds, and thus, what we think we know about 
ourselves, and our experience, is really the result of an attribution generated from an abstract 
informational model. 
Crowdsourcing Consciousness 
"You only exist as a pattern made up of all the other things in your life that shape 
you . If you take each away, 'you ' would eventually cease to exist. This does not 
mean that you do not exist at all, but rather that you exist as a combination of all 
others who complete your sense of self " 
Bruce Hood (2012) 
The Attention Schema Theory offers an useful paradigm for thinking about the mind and 
experience . By deflating the way in which think about consciousness, Graziano and many of the 
other modem physicalists, make the Hard Problem tractable - by claiming there really is not a 
problem at all. However, this approach is certainly contentious and divisive . The real problem, it 
appears, is deciding how to navigate an epistemic dead-end. Are we correct in holding on to our 
belief in qualia, the ineffable, but apparent, aspect of our experience? Or, should we rather find a 
creative escape from the problem, which involves some degree of mental gymnastics, to impart a 
theory which is constructive though counter-intuitive? 
Perhaps we are too quick to conflate counter-intuitive with misguided. Throughout 
history, many of the ideas which challenged the status-quo of the time proved later to be most 
influential. The history of thought is punctuated by radical thinkers - consider the framework 
proposed by Charles Darwin, whose Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection was a direct 
contradiction of the universal understanding of much of the previous interpretation underlying 
the biological sciences (1859). It took many years of criticism before Darwin's theory began to 
resonate with others in the field, but it has forever changed the direction of biology since. It is 
possible the same sort of frameshift will transpire from the controversial ideas proposed by 
Dennett and Graziano, though only time will tell. 
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Thinking about consciousness through the lens of Graziano's theory does nevertheless 
enact change in the present. His ideas are inescapably social in nature, and adopting them has a 
direct influence on the nature of our relationships with others. The manner in which we think 
about others is colored by collective social phenomena - we infer what others may be like 
based on our history of past experiences in a shared social environment. Through socialization, 
through culture, and through relationships, we learn what others are like. In the same way, you 
come to learn yourself. By recognizing the ways in which our experience of the world is shared, 
rather than private, an emphasis is placed on interconnectedness and mutual dependence on 
others. In sum, you, and I, and all others, are crowdsourced. 
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REFLECTIONS 
In sum, my capstone project was an exploration of the questions surrounding conscious 
experience. When I first became involved in philosophy, the constellation of questions about the 
mind are what most resonated with me. During my time as an undergraduate, I was fortunate to 
have a broad education in both the humanities and science. This approach I had always seen as 
valuable - the ability to approach a challenging topic from multiple avenues made it more 
accessible, and allowed me to better appreciate how intricate some questions could be. 
While researching and writing my capstone project, I sought the same interdisciplinary 
approach. This proved to be a worthwhile approach - philosophers, psychologists, and 
neuroscientists alike have all independently sought to understand consciousness through their 
respective fields, and thus, a rich body of research and literature was readily available. My goal 
with this project was to familiarize myself with these ideas, and highlight a sort of consilience, 
wherein many of the ideas and theories overlapped in constructive ways . 
I chose to research consciousness, rather than say free will or artificial intelligence, 
largely because of the magnitude of the problem and implications in medicine. Until somewhat 
recently, the study of consciousness was considered to be a fringe topic in the sciences -
perhaps because of the manner in which it naturally attracts quack ideas and pseudoscience (e.g., 
we will things into existence by directing quantum energy coherence), but despite meaningful 
progress, still remains on the periphery of what is acceptable. Fortunately, the study of 
consciousness is working to dispel some grandiose ideas in favor of scientific reductionism, 
offering serious promise for advancing the understanding areas like anesthesiology. Given that 
my intent is to pursue medicine, studying this problem in particular was a way to unite my 
interests with an area of research that is both growing rapidly and gaining popularity. 
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Prior to beginning this capstone project, I had been fortunate to work for years as a 
research assistant in the Multisensory Cognition Lab on campus. This background proved 
invaluable; it armed we with a familiarity with the research process and how to best go about 
finding useful information, but even more importantly, I developed a scientific lens through 
which I would evaluate ideas. During my Junior year I applied for, and was awarded, and URCO 
grant to conduct my own research project; for the study, I investigated Theory of Mind, the 
ability to think about what other's are thinking, using electroencephalography (EEG). 
Researching Theory of Mind from the perspective of social-cognitive neuroscience 
proved to be more philosophically engaging than I would have expected. Consider the "problem 
of other minds": we have no direct access to the minds of others, we are familiar only with our 
own experience, so would it ever be possible to prove objectively that another person is 
conscious? The inner mental life of others is a closed-off black box, so the brain constructs a 
"theory of mind" to establish a best guess about what another may be thinking, what they may 
desire, or how they will behave. 
Within the sciences, the approach is to often tackle a microcosmic question - and for 
good reason, as one becomes more "big-picture" the claims made often end up more speculation 
than science. However, I felt the two approaches could be more synergistic than antagonistic, so I 
resolved to explore the way in which my research in neuroscience may interface with questions 
about consciousness. Soon thereafter, I stumbled across a book written by Michael Graziano, 
Consciousness and the Social Brain, wherein he argued that consciousness is really an attribution 
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based on limited evidence (i.e ., theory of mind) and that absent a social environment , we would 
not have developed this subjective perspective. After speaking with Dr. Charlie Huenemann, we 
decided this would be an interesting question to research further for my capstone. 
When first beginning my capstone, I hadn't yet developed a concrete theory or thesis 
statement. At most, I had a vague interest in the ideas presented in Graziano's book. Without any 
clear direction in mind, the initial research proved challenging; Dr. Huenemann and I were able 
to identify plenty of interesting books and articles, and although reading through them all was 
certainly worthwhile, it was not always clear what sort of connection I should be looking for, so 
it was tough to gauge my progress. 
Whereas I had initially set out to explore this one particular question - how theory of 
mind and consciousness may be intimately interconnected - I instead dedicated only a small 
section to that topic in my actual capstone. In outlining my ideas, I wrote a brief history of the 
main theories and problems with the study of consciousness throughout time; as it turned out, I 
enjoyed this much more than focusing in on just one aspect of the question. Consequently , I 
resolved to broaden my focus, choosing instead to write about consciousness generally. 
The end product was a synthesis of my undergraduate career . I gained an appreciation for 
the overlap between the many fields in which I was interested in, and synthesize them into a 
concise theory which I had long sought. In early April, I was able to present this theory during a 
20-minute talk at The Science of Consciousness, an interdisciplinary research conference held 
each year. After may presentation, I received very positive feedback and constructive ideas about 
future directions. Finally, I was able to network with medical school faculty, most notably the 
director of the Center for Consciousness Science at the University of Michigan Medical School. 
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